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Are Universities Patent Trolls? 
Mark A. Lemley* 
ABSTRACT 
Hold-up is a primary component of patent litigation and patent 
licensing today.  Universities are engaged in an unprecedented 
surge in patenting.  At the confluence of these seemingly unrelated 
developments is a growing frustration on the part of industry with 
the role of universities as patent owners.  Time and again, when I 
talk to people in a variety of industries, their view is that 
universities are the new patent trolls. 
In this article, I argue that universities should take a broader 
view of their role in technology transfer.  University technology 
transfer ought to have as its goal maximizing the social impact of 
technology, not merely maximizing the university’s licensing 
revenue.  Sometimes those goals will coincide with the university’s 
short-term financial interests.  Sometimes universities will 
maximize the impact of an invention on society by granting 
exclusive licenses for substantial revenue to a company that will 
 
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2732.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
* © 2008 Mark A. Lemley, William H. Neukom Professor of Law, Stanford Law School; 
of counsel, Keker & Van Nest LLP.  I am particularly grateful to a large number of 
people who read this and gave me comments, even though simply asking the question is 
anathema to many of them.  In particular, thanks are due to David Adelman, Ann Arvin, 
Robert Barr, Linda Chao, Maggie Chon, Michael Cleare, Peter Detkin, Rochelle 
Dreyfuss, Brett Frischmann, Carl Gulbrandsen, Rose Hagan, Joel Kirschbaum, Kathy Ku, 
Gary Loeb, Mike Mireles, Lita Nelsen, Alan Paau, Arti Rai, David Simon, and Janna 
Tom, and to participants in conferences at Washington University School of Law and the 
Licensing Executives Society/Association of University Technology Managers joint 
meeting for comments on this topic.  Not only don’t they necessarily agree with what I’ve 
said, in many cases I’m sure they don’t.  This is an edited transcript of a speech, and 
reads like it. 
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take the invention and commercialize it.  Sometimes, but not 
always.  At other times a non-exclusive license, particularly on a 
basic enabling technology, will ultimately maximize the 
invention’s impact on society by allowing a large number of 
people to commercialize in different areas, to try out different 
things and see if they work, and the like.  University policies might 
be made more nuanced than simply a choice between exclusive 
and non-exclusive licenses.  For example, they might grant field-
specific exclusivity, or exclusivity only for a limited term, or 
exclusivity only for commercial sales while exempting research, 
and they might condition continued exclusivity on achievement of 
certain dissemination goals.  Particularly in the software context, 
there are many circumstances in which the social impact of 
technology transfer is maximized either by the university not 
patenting at all or by granting licenses to those patents on a 
royalty-free basis to all comers. 
Finally, I think we can learn something about the raging debate 
over who is a patent troll and what to do about trolls by looking at 
university patents.  Universities are non-practicing entities.  They 
share some characteristics with trolls, at least if the term is broadly 
defined, but they are not trolls.  Asking what distinguishes 
universities from trolls can actually help us figure out what 
concerns us about trolls.  What we ought to do is abandon the 
search for a group of individual companies to define as bad actors.  
In my view, troll is as troll does.  Universities will sometimes be 
bad actors.  So will non-manufacturing patent owners. So will 
manufacturing patent owners.  Instead of singling out bad actors, 
we should focus on the bad acts and the laws that make them 
possible. 
I. COMPLAINTS ABOUT UNIVERSITY PATENTS 
The confluence of two significant developments in modern 
patent practice leads me to write a paper with such a provocative 
title.1 
 
 1 So I don’t give anyone a coronary, the general answer to the question in my title is 
no. 
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A. The Rise of Patent Hold-up 
The first development is the rise of hold-up as a primary 
component of patent litigation and patent licensing.  You can call 
this the troll problem if you like.2  I prefer to think of it as the hold-
up problem.  But whatever we call the problem, it seems quite 
clear that more and more patent litigation is being filed, and 
significant money is being made, by non-manufacturing entities—
entities that don’t themselves actually make the product and in 
many cases don’t actually engage in developing the technology 
very far at all.  Many of these entities also engage in tactics that 
allow them to lay low and then take a mature industry by surprise 
once participants in the industry have made irreversible 
investments.3  The hold-up or troll problem is particularly 
significant in component-driven industries, notably information 
technology (“IT”), where the problem is compounded by the fact 
that a product developer such as Intel that must aggregate 
thousands of different inventions into its semiconductor chip is 
vulnerable to hold-up by any one of the thousands of inventors.  
Patent owners in those component industries can capture far more 
than the intrinsic value of their invention, because under long-
standing patent law4 patent owners have had the right not just to 
sue and get paid the percentage of the value contributed by their 
invention but to enjoin the sale of Intel’s entire chip until it can 
design a new chip that avoids infringing that patent, something that 
might take years and require investing billions of dollars in a new 
fab.5  These factors have combined to produce the growth industry 
of the new millennium: patent hold-up.  Hundreds of companies 
 
 2 The term “patent troll” was coined in the late 1990s by Peter Detkin, then assistant 
general counsel at Intel, to refer to patent owners who hide under bridges they did not 
build to pop out and demand money from surprised passers-by.  I’ll talk about some 
definitions of “patent troll” at the end of this Article. 
 3 For discussions of this problem, see, for example, Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to 
Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 149 
(2007) [hereinafter Lemley, Ten Things]; Mark R. Patterson, Inventions, Industry 
Standards, and Intellectual Property, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1043, 1048–51 (2002). 
 4 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 281, 283–84 (2007). 
 5 On this problem and how it leads to settlements well in excess of the intrinsic value 
of the patent, see Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 2163, 2172–73 (2007); Carl Shapiro, A Model of Patent Bargaining With 
Holdup (2006) (working paper, on file with author). 
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are engaging in efforts to capture not just the value of what they 
contributed to an invention, but also a disproportionate share of 
somebody else’s product. 
B. The Rise of University Patenting 
The second development in the last three decades is the 
massive surge in university patenting.6  Universities obtained 
sixteen times as many patents in 2004 as in 1980,7 and universities 
had 100 times as many technology transfer offices.8  In significant 
measure this is a result of the Bayh-Dole Act,9 which not only 
permits but encourages university patenting of federally-funded 
inventions.  But it is also a reflection of the growth in importance 
of patents more generally.  Those university patents don’t sit 
dormant; universities license them to companies for over $1 billion 
a year in revenue.10  Patents are now a significant contributor to 
some university bottom lines.  And importantly, more and more 
university patents are patents on the very earliest stages of 
technology.  It is universities, perhaps not surprisingly given their 
role in basic research, who are patenting the basic building blocks 
in new technologies.  We see this with particular force in 
 
 6 For a discussion of the growth of university patenting and its potential risks, see 
DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-
INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT 4 (2004); 
John R. Allison et al., University Software Ownership: Trends, Determinants, Issues 
(2005) (working paper, on file with author); Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven 
Research and University Technology Transfer, in UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 93 (Gary D. 
Libecap ed., 2005). 
 7 Before 1980, universities worldwide obtained about 250 U.S. patents a year.  In 
2003, they obtained 3,933 patents, an almost sixteen-fold increase. See Bernard Wysocki 
Jr., College Try: Columbia’s Pursuit of Patent Riches Angers Companies, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 21, 2004, at A1. 
 8 Lorelai Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the 
Cost?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1412 (2007) (“There were only 25 active technology-
transfer offices in the United States at the time the Bayh-Dole Act was passed.  By the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of the Act, there were 3300.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 9 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2000). 
 10 See Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole 
Act, 301 SCI. 1052, 1052 (2003); The Big Ten: Universities That Made the Most 
Licensing Dollars Last Year, IP L. & BUS., Jan. 5, 2005, at 14 (estimating $1 billion in 
2004); Wysocki, supra note 7, at A1, A12 (estimating $1.3 billion per year). 
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nanotechnology, an area I have studied in detail.11  Universities, 
which account for 1% of patents on average across all fields, 
account for 12% of all patents in nanotechnology, and more than 
two-thirds of what I identify as the basic building block patents in 
nanotechnology.12  The other area in which university patents are 
significant is biotechnology, where they represent about 18% of all 
patents.13  As a result, universities have met a much bigger role in 
patenting than they ever have before. 
C. Are Universities Engaged in Hold-up? 
At the confluence of these developments is a growing 
frustration on the part of industry with the role of universities as 
patent owners.  Time and again, when I talk to people in a variety 
of industries, their view is that universities are the new patent 
trolls.  One even referred publicly to universities as “crack addicts” 
driven by “small-minded tech transfer offices” addicted to patent 
royalties.14 
Why such a vehement reaction?  One important reason is that 
universities are non-manufacturing entities.  They don’t sell 
products.  I don’t think that necessarily means they’re bad actors.  
But it does mean that their incentives in dealing with the patent 
system align in many ways with those of private-sector patent 
licensing shops.  One of the assumptions corporations in patent-
intensive industries (such as IT or increasingly biotechnology) 
make about patenting is symmetry: that if a competitor sues you 
for infringement you can sue them back.  That symmetry deters 
much patent litigation in the industries in which it operates.15  But 
 
 11 Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601 (2005) 
[hereinafter Lemley, Nanotechnology]. 
 12 Id. at 616, 616 tbl.2. 
 13 See David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of 
Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 1687 & n.44 (2007) 
(noting that in 1994 university and government patenting “accounted for twenty percent 
[of biotechnology patents] and has remained at that level ever since”). 
 14 Chuck Fish, Comments at the Fordham Annual Conference on International 
Intellectual Property Law & Policy (Apr. 22, 2006). 
 15 See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 474 (2004) 
(finding that semiconductor patents are litigated only 1/3 as often as other patents, and 
offering the symmetry of relationships as an explanation).  To be sure, other factors, such 
as industry concentration and large patent portfolios, may play a significant role in 
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that symmetry doesn’t often exist for non-manufacturing entities.  
Universities aren’t going to trade their patents away in exchange 
for a cross-license, because they don’t need a license to other 
people’s patent rights.16  Instead, they want money.  And to an IT 
general counsel who deals with dozens of threats of suit every 
year, any patent owner in that position looks an awful lot like a 
patent troll.  In short, there’s definitely a sense among industry 
representatives that universities are greedy when it comes to 
licensing patents.17 
Compounding the perception of greed is that university patent 
licensing offices have strong institutional incentives to grant 
exclusive rather than non-exclusive licenses, for various reasons.  
First, exclusive licensing royalty rates are almost always higher 
than non-exclusive rates.  That’s not surprising, since the licensee 
is getting more from an exclusive license than from a non-
exclusive license.  From the perspective of a technology transfer 
office focused on this quarter’s bottom line, that higher royalty rate 
is hard to turn down.  Second, the companies with which they are 
negotiating often want exclusivity.18  They are especially likely to 
get it if the company in question is a faculty-organized startup.19  
Finally, exclusive licensees often pay the cost of patent 
prosecution, a relatively small savings but an immediate one that 
 
causing disputes in this industry to be resolved without litigation. See Gideon 
Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 63–64 (2005). 
 16 Theoretically, universities could be sued for infringement, but they aren’t—there is 
only one reported decision involving an infringement suit against a university between 
1983 and 2004. See Tao Huang, The Experimental Purpose Doctrine and Biomedical 
Research, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 97, 111–12 & tbl.1 (2004).  There may 
be other cases that settle before decision, however.  For reasons universities aren’t sued, 
see Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do 
Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 942–44 (2006). 
 17 A surprising dissenting view suggests that universities are overly cautious in 
licensing intellectual property. See Kristen Osenga, Rembrandts in the Research Lab: 
Why Universities Should Take a Lesson from Big Business to Increase Innovation, 59 
ME. L. REV. 407, 408–11 (2007).  I don’t believe that either the data (which show an 
enormous increase in both patenting and licensing by universities) or the experiences of 
those I’ve talked to support this characterization. 
 18 See, e.g., William J. Holstein, Putting Bright Ideas to Work Off Campus, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 5, 2006, § 3, at 11 (“Companies, on the other hand, want exclusive licenses.”) 
(quoting William R. Brody, president of Johns Hopkins University). 
 19 de Larena, supra note 8, at 1415 (referring to “tacit favoritism” of such companies). 
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impacts the technology transfer office’s bottom line.  The result is 
that the overwhelming majority of university patent licenses are 
exclusive.  The Association of University Technology Managers 
(“AUTM”) reports that more than 60% of its members’ 2005 
licenses were exclusive.20  In the nanotech licenses I studied (just a 
few dozen, admittedly), between 95 and 100% of the university 
licenses granted were exclusive.21  One example from the 
biotechnology field of an exclusive license to an enabling 
technology is the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation’s 
(“WARF”) field-exclusive license to Geron of all stem cell patents, 
granted shortly before those stem cell patents became 
extraordinarily valuable because the Bush administration 
obstructed the development of new stem cell lines.22 
In fact, however, this higher royalty rate may or may not 
translate into a higher revenue stream for the university.  Whether 
it does, depends on the nature of the technology being licensed.  
For certain basic building blocks—what I call “enabling 
technologies”—opening up licensing to many innovators who can 
develop different uses will generate substantial improvements, 
while giving an exclusive license to only one person will generate 
fewer improvements.23  And exclusive licenses can block any 
 
 20 AUTM U.S. Licensing Survey, FY 2005, http://www.autm.net/events/File/ 
US_LS_05Final(1).pdf. 
 21 Lemley, Nanotechnology, supra note 11, at 627 (citing ETC GROUP, NANOTECH’S 
“SECOND NATURE” PATENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GLOBAL SOUTH 14 (June 2005), 
http://www.etcgroup.org/documents/Com8788SpecialPNanoMar-Jun05ENG.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2008)). See also Allison et al., supra note 6, § 5 (discussing exclusive 
licenses of software patents by universities). 
 22 See, e.g., Amy Rachel Davis, Patented Embryonic Stem Cells: The Quintessential 
“Essential Facility”?, 94 GEO. L.J. 205, 210 n.21 (2005); Ryan Fujikawa, Federal 
Funding of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research: An Institutional Examination, 78 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1075–60 (2005).  Those patents are now under reexamination at the 
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), however, and WARF has significantly eased its 
licensing restrictions, particularly for academic research.  For a discussion, see Antonio 
Regalado & David P. Hamilton, How a University’s Patents May Limit Stem-Cell 
Research, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2006, at B1. 
 23 I have made this argument in detail elsewhere, see for example Mark A. Lemley, The 
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997), 
and I won’t repeat it here. 
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development of a technology if the licensee doesn’t deliver.24  
Even if in the long run non-exclusive licensing of many 
technologies actually increases university revenue, in the short run 
a university tech-transfer office seeking to maximize the amount of 
money that the office generates will tend to grant exclusive 
licenses.  Exclusive licenses aren’t necessarily bad—a point I 
discuss below—but they raise concerns about the effective 
diffusion of new technologies. 
A final reason for industry concern about university patenting 
is that universities are increasingly enforcing their patents.  Recent 
years have seen high-profile cases litigated to judgment by the 
University of California, the University of Rochester, Harvard, 
MIT, Columbia, Stanford, and suits filed by many other 
universities.  One notable example is Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp.,25 in which the University of California licensed a 
software patent to a company that really does look like a patent 
troll, however you want to define that term, and then shared with 
that company a jury award of $520.6 million against Microsoft.26 
Universities, recognizing patent licensing and litigation as an 
important revenue source in the modern environment, have been 
active in politics, largely in alignment with the life sciences 
industries (from which most university patent revenue comes), in 
opposing most of the effective pieces of draft patent reform 
legislation.  Universities helped argue for eliminating from the 
2005 patent reform bill any restrictions on both injunctive relief 
 
 24 Rochelle Dreyfuss relates the story of Johns Hopkins’ ill-fated exclusive license to 
Baxter for a patent that Baxter didn’t use. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Unique Works/Unique 
Challenges at the Intellectual Property/Competition Law Interface 5 (N.Y.U. Sch. of 
Law Ctr. for Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 05-12, 2005), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=763688.  The exclusivity 
of the license prevented CellPro, which independently developed a commercial use for 
the invention, from licensing it from the university. See id. 
 25 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 26 Id. at 1332.  A more recent high-profile case involved the Harvard-MIT patent 
successfully enforced against Eli Lilly for $65 million. See Brian Kladko, Ariad, research 
institutes win patent-infringement case against Eli Lilly, BOSTON BUS. J., May 4, 2006, 
available at http://boston.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2006/05/01/daily48.html. For 
documenting of other cases, see Allison et al., supra note 6, § 5; Rowe, supra note 16, at 
936–37. 
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and continuation applications.  The patent reform bill27 also faced 
attacks from some universities seeking to eliminate the move to 
first inventor to file, which doesn’t benefit them because they tend 
to file later than commercial entities, and eliminate the creation of 
prior user rights, which also don’t benefit them since they aren’t 
generally using the inventions.  These university preferences 
should not be surprising, at least if we view the university as a 
profit-maximizing entity rather than one concerned with the social 
good.  Like other non-manufacturing entities, after all, universities 
are first and foremost intellectual property (“IP”) owners, not IP 
licensees. 
The result is a felt sense among a lot of people that universities 
are not good actors in the patent system. Given the difficulty 
anyone has had in defining a patent troll, it is easy to move from 
that conclusion to the idea that universities are trolls too.  I think it 
is worth questioning that leap. There is something going on here, 
but I’m not sure that it is reasonable to equate university patents 
with private troll behavior.  The common refrain in complaints 
about patent trolls is that they are not contributing anything to 
society, but rather obtaining and asserting patents covering 
technology independently developed by defendants. The question 
remaining to be answered is whether the same is true of university 
patents. In other words, it’s worth asking whether society needs or 
wants university patents at all. 
II. DO WE NEED UNIVERSITY PATENTS? 
From the perspective of the university, one justification for 
university patents may be to fund universities.  More money is 
better than less money, and the billion dollars each year in 
licensing is a substantial new revenue source for universities, most 
of which goes to research, and some of which goes to education.  If 
you think research and education are under-funded in our society 
today, as I tend to believe, generating that additional revenue 
 
 27 The “Coalition Draft” of the Patent Reform Act, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005) (as 
modified by Congressman Lamar Smith of Texas on Sept. 1, 2005) was the specific 
target of these attacks, but they are just as relevant to the legislative debate in the 110th 
Congress. 
LEMLEY_022508_FINAL 2/25/2008  7:22:20 PM 
620 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 18 
sounds useful in a way that paying for-profit licensing shops 
doesn’t.  But the additional revenue is not costless:  it is money 
that comes out of industry pockets, and at least some of it would 
otherwise have gone to industry research and development, or to 
selling better products, or to providing products more cheaply.  So, 
it is worth thinking about the costs of patents as a pure wealth-
transfer mechanism. Most economists would agree that if our goal 
is to adequately fund higher education, patent litigation is an 
inefficient way of doing so.28  Further, some argue that a culture of 
patenting imposes costs on the university or on academic research 
more generally.29  University scientists focused on patenting may 
delay or even forego publication in favor of IP protection.30  And 
there is substantial literature on how the shift to university 
patenting has actually moved universities away from basic research 
and towards more applied research in ways that are arguably bad 
for society in the long run.31  The risk is not so much that 
individual professors will change their research habits as that the 
departments that grow will be ones that generate money, and that 
the new faculty hiring slots will go to those who engage in 
revenue-generating applied research.  Of course, government and 
private foundation grants can come with conditions attached, and 
 
 28 A general tax is a cheaper method of wealth transfer than specific assessments. See, 
e.g., ALAN J. AUERBACH & LAWRENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, DYNAMIC FISCAL POLICY 55–87 
(1987). 
 29 See generally JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION 
OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2005). 
 30 See generally MOWERY ET AL., supra note 6, at 9–34; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 
177 (1987).  Margo Bagley has documented this problem, and in the hopes of eliminating 
it, proposed giving university inventors more time to file patent applications after 
publishing articles. Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: 
Putting Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 217 (2006). 
 31 Pierre Azoulay et al., The Impact of Academic Patenting on the Rate, Quality, and 
Direction of (Public) Research, (NBER Working Paper No. 11917, 2006), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11917; Brett M. Frischmann, Commercializing University 
Research Systems in Economic Perspective: A View From the Demand Side, in 16 
UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 6, at 155, 176–78; Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 177; 
MOWERY ET AL., supra note 6, at 9–34; Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole 
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW  & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003); see 
generally Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and 
the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999). 
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can also direct research to particular ends, so in practice they aren’t 
perfect funding mechanisms either. 
Why else might society need university patents?  The classic 
justification for patents—creating incentives to innovate—
arguably isn’t nearly as important in the university context as in 
the private sector.  I think it unlikely that university scientists 
would not do research or invent in the absence of patent protection.  
There are plenty of other incentives for university scientists to 
engage in research, including curiosity, academic prestige, and 
tenure and promotion.  Further, university inventors are generally 
funded by grants or departmental revenue, must assign their rights 
to the university,32 and don’t necessarily see any tangible benefit 
from university patenting of their inventions.  Now, this doesn’t 
necessarily mean that patents have no additional effect.  It may be 
that patents generate some revenue which is refunded to the 
researcher’s department and supports further research, and even 
that the prospect of that additional funding motivates some 
research.  But the contribution of patents to university incentives to 
innovate seems smaller than in profit-driven companies. 
The final reason we might want university patents—and the 
argument that actually prevailed in the congressional debates over 
Bayh-Dole—is the commercialization argument.  Unlike the 
classic incentive story, commercialization theory argues that it is 
not so much the act of invention, but instead the act of turning that 
invention into a marketable product that requires investment and 
therefore the exclusion of competition.33  According to this theory, 
university inventions will languish and not be commercialized 
unless we give someone (initially the university, but presumably 
eventually a private company to which the right is licensed or 
transferred) control over the invention, and therefore incentive to 
invest in developing and marketing it.  This argument seems 
 
 32 See generally CORYNNE MCSHERRY, WHO OWNS ACADEMIC WORK?: BATTLING FOR 
CONTROL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 144–89 (2001). 
 33 See generally John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 439 (2004); F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property 
Rights and the Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
691 (2001); Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 265 (1977); Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent 
Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065 (2007). 
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particularly strong with respect to university inventions, since we 
can reasonably expect those inventions involve more basic 
research, and therefore to be made at an earlier stage, than private 
inventions. 
There is some debate as to whether the commercialization 
theory is actually true of university inventions.  Mowery, Nelson, 
Sampat, and Ziedonis suggest that Bayh-Dole was based on 
concerns that were misstated, or at least overstated.34  They argue 
that there was a good deal of technology transfer without 
university patents in the decades before Bayh-Dole, and that even 
today there is plenty of university technology transfer that occurs 
in the absence of patents.35  By contrast, the prevailing wisdom 
seems to be that university patents increase commercialization, and 
therefore that Bayh-Dole has been a success.36  Certainly they 
increase commercialization deals between universities and 
companies,37 though it is hard to know the extent to which that 
simply reflects the fact that once a patent issues, the company in 
question needs a license in order to commercialize the technology. 
My own view is that the validity of commercialization theory 
depends a great deal on the industry in question and the particular 
 
 34 MOWERY ET AL., supra note 6, at 85–97. See also Michael S. Mireles, Jr., States as 
Innovation System Laboratories: California, Patents, and Stem Cell Technology, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1133, 1136 (2006) (describing Bayh-Dole as “one of the most 
controversial pieces of intellectual property law related legislation”). 
 35 Id. at 99–148.  Inferential empirical evidence for this is provided by Daniel 
Elfenbein, who shows that the majority of technologies developed at Harvard are licensed 
before the grant of patent rights, and often without a patent application. Daniel W. 
Elfenbein, Publications, Patents, and the Market for University Inventions, 63 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 688, tbls. 1, 6, 8 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=739227; 
see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and 
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996) 
(discussing ways in which patents do and do not promote commercialization of university 
research).  One of the leading objections to university patenting comes from Strandburg, 
supra note 6. 
 36 See, e.g., WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT: THE 
BAYH-DOLE ACT: SELECTED ISSUES IN PATENT POLICY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
TECHNOLOGY (2006), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07 
Jan/RL32076.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2007); Chester G. Moore, Killing the Bayh-Dole 
Act’s Golden Goose, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 151, 155–57 (2006).  For an 
analysis of both the benefits and costs, see Thomas J. Siepmann, The Global Exportation 
of the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV. 236, 229–38 (2004). 
 37 See Elfenbein, supra note 35, at 690. 
LEMLEY_022508_FINAL 2/25/2008  7:22:20 PM 
2008] ARE UNIVERSITIES PATENT TROLLS? 623 
nature of the technology.  In the pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industries, where coming up with an invention is only the first step 
down a very long road of regulatory process that can take hundreds 
of millions of dollars and several years, the commercialization 
argument makes some sense.  The university generally isn’t going 
to seek regulatory approval, and arguably we need to give 
somebody exclusive rights to induce them to make the regulatory 
investments that the university itself isn’t going to make.  We give 
the right to the university, but we do so expecting that they will 
transfer or exclusively license that right to a private company that 
will recoup the hundreds of millions of dollars they spend in 
clinical trials, product development, and marketing.38  Other 
industries might also have a long post-invention development cycle 
and therefore be good candidates for commercialization theory.  
That might be true of basic building block technologies like 
nanotechnology, where we expect a very long road between the 
development of the invention and the ultimate 
commercialization,39 though it is likely too early to say for sure 
how nanotech will develop.  In these industries, Bayh-Dole is 
probably a good thing. 
On the other hand, I’m doubtful that central control is 
necessary to produce commercialization in the majority of other 
industries.40  Bear in mind that the commercialization story is at 
base anti-market: it assumes, contrary to centuries of economic 
 
 38 Interestingly, though, even industry players in the pharmaceutical industry 
sometimes lament university reliance on exclusive licensing. See Siepmann, supra note 
35, at 236–37 (quoting Joshua Kalkstein, corporate counsel for Pfizer). 
 39 Lemley, Nanotechnology, supra note 11, at 628–29. 
 40 Empirical evidence supports the conclusion that patenting reduces rather than 
increases technology diffusion overall.  Murray and Stern find that patenting is associated 
with reduced citation to an academic publication associated with the patent. Fiona 
Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of 
Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W11465, 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=755701.  Were commercialization 
theory true, it should be the opposite.  And Rosell and Agrawal find that university 
inventions are diffusing less widely over time, not more widely. Carlos Rosell & Ajay 
Agrawal, University Patenting: Estimating the Diminishing Breadth of Knowledge 
Diffusion and Consumption (Oct. 2006) (working paper), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12640.  Again, were commercialization theory true, it 
should be the opposite. 
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learning, that ordinary profit motives will not produce efficient 
allocation of resources and that we need to vest exclusive control 
of a technology or market in one actor in order to get that efficient 
allocation.41  Even if we think that’s true in the pharmaceutical or 
biotechnology industries because of the regulatory barriers to entry 
in those markets, we should not conclude exclusivity is always or 
even generally required to encourage a company to bring a product 
to market.42  In the IT industries, and even in industries like 
medical devices, there is no reason to believe that exclusive rights 
are necessary to encourage commercialization of the technology.  
It is true even in those industries that when an inventor has gotten 
to the point where she can patent something, there may still be 
development and marketing work to be done.  But we get plenty of 
both in a competitive marketplace because the companies who 
engage in product development and marketing can reap enough of 
the benefits of that investment to make it worthwhile.  And indeed 
we have seen an enormous number of technologies 
commercialized out of universities throughout the 20th Century 
without need of university patents.  Think of the computer, the 
world wide web, search engines, relational databases, and any 
number of software programs.43 
The need for university patents, in short, depends critically on 
the technology at issue.  I think much of the industry frustration 
with the role of university patents stems from the failure of some 
university technology transfer offices to recognize and adapt to 
these technology differences.  As noted above, technology transfer 
offices have strong incentives to maximize revenue from patent 
licensing.  To achieve this, they have adopted the life sciences 
 
 41 See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 147 (2004) [hereinafter Lemley, Ex Ante]. 
 42 More and more property rights scholars seem to forget the benefits of a market 
economy.  I have heard academics suggest, for instance, that we may not get efficient 
entry of Indian restaurants into particular neighborhoods unless we grant some sort of 
regional exclusivity. Maybe that’s right, but I doubt it.  The market has worked pretty 
well in the past, and we should be reluctant to forego its benefits unless we’re quite sure 
that the alternative will be better. 
 43 For a detailed discussion of one example, Apache, see Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, 
Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 319, 394–96 (2005).  “The Apache Software 
Foundation provides support for the Apache community of open-source software 
projects.” http://www.apache.org (last visited Jan. 12, 2008). 
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model, where exclusive rights and patents seem to make sense 
because of the regulatory delays, as their general approach to 
patent licensing.  But they are increasingly using it in software and 
other information technologies.44  The result is frustration on the 
part of industry counterparts in industries like computers or 
telecommunications that are more interested in freedom to operate 
than in exclusive rights over a new technology.  It may also be 
frustration on the part of tech transfer offices; less than 1% of all 
university patent licenses generate over $1 million in revenue.45  
And efforts to commercialize the rest is what leads to a lot of the 
more worrisome patent licenses in cases like Eolas.46 
III. LESSONS FROM THE UNIVERSITY PATENT EXPERIENCE 
A. Towards an Enlightened University Patent Policy 
Universities should take a broader view of their role in 
technology transfer.  University technology transfer ought to have 
as its goal maximizing the social impact of technology, not merely 
maximizing the university’s licensing revenue.47  A university is 
more than just a private for-profit entity.  It is a public-regarding 
institution that should be advancing the development and spread of 
knowledge and the beneficial use of that knowledge.48  Sometimes 
those goals will coincide with the university’s short-term financial 
interests.  Sometimes universities will maximize the impact of an 
invention on society by granting exclusive licenses for substantial 
revenue to a company that will take the invention and 
 
 44 See Allison et al., supra note 6, § 1 (documenting the growth in university software 
patenting). 
 45 See Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole 
Act, 301 SCI. 1052, 1052 (2003) (0.56%). 
 46 Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 457 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 47 For a similar view, see Robert E. Litan et al., Commercializing University 
Inventions: A Better Way (Apr. 2007) (working paper, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research), 
available at http://www.kauffman.org/pdf/NBER_0407.pdf.  Osenga, by contrast, 
suggests that universities should act more like private businesses in licensing their 
patents, paying more attention to the short-run bottom line.  Osenga, supra note 17, at 2.  
Again, I disagree. 
 48 Certainly that is the role universities claim for themselves in their mission 
statements. 
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commercialize it.  Sometimes, but not always.  At other times a 
non-exclusive license, particularly on a basic enabling technology, 
will ultimately maximize the invention’s impact on society by 
allowing a large number of people to commercialize in different 
areas, to try out different things and see if they work, and the 
like.49  Universities can still earn revenue from nonexclusive 
licenses, and for enabling technologies they might even maximize 
their revenue in the long term by granting nonexclusive rather than 
exclusive licenses.50   
University policies might be made more nuanced than simply a 
choice between exclusive and nonexclusive licenses.  For example, 
they might grant field-specific exclusivity, or exclusivity only for a 
limited term, or exclusivity only for commercial sales while 
exempting research,51 and they might condition continued 
exclusivity on achievement of certain dissemination goals.52  
Finally, particularly in the software context, there are many 
circumstances in which the social impact of technology transfer is 
maximized either by the university not patenting at all or by 
granting licenses to those patents on a royalty-free basis to all 
 
 49 See Lemley, Nanotechnology, supra note 11, at 627–45; Ted Sabety, 
Nanotechnology Innovation and the Patent Thicket: Which IP Policies Promote Growth?, 
15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 477, 510–12 (2005). 
 50 The key university patents on enabling technologies in biotechnology, issued to 
Cohen and Boyer for the creation of chimeric organisms and to Axel for methods of 
inserting genes into a cell, were licensed nonexclusively because of then-existing NIH 
requirements. See Wysocki, supra note 7, at A1.  They made enormous sums of money 
for Stanford, the University of California, and Columbia, arguably because, not in spite 
of, the nonexclusivity of the licenses. See Sally Smith Hughes, Making Dollars Out of 
DNA: The First Major Patent in Biotechnology and the Commercialization of Molecular 
Biology, 1974-1980, 92 ISIS 541, 569–70 & n.77 (2001); Wysocki, supra note 7, at A1. 
Amy Kapczynski has argued that open licensing may be profitable for universities more 
generally, not just with enabling technologies. See Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing 
Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1088–89 (2005).  I am less persuaded by this broader 
argument. 
 51 For examples of such approaches, including Stanford’s and WARF’s, see Ritchie de 
Larena, supra note 8, at 1420. 
 52 Stanford University has a relatively enlightened university technology transfer policy 
that uses all of these intermediate mechanisms. Conversations with Linda Chao, Senior 
Licensing Associate, Stanford Office of Technology Licensing, Stanford, Cal. (May 
2006).  Stanford’s official policy is available at http://otl.stanford.edu/inventors/ 
resources/otlandinvent.html. 
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comers.53  Open source software development is one example, but 
hardly the only one.54 
If we are to achieve the goal of maximizing the social benefit 
of a university invention to society, universities must first 
recognize their proper role in society and how that role affects 
patent policies.  An important first step in that education process is 
to end the isolation of university technology transfer or licensing 
offices from the rest of the university.55  If universities treat 
licensing offices as revenue generation devices, evaluated on how 
much money they bring in each quarter, the result will be 
university patent policies that are not always or even often 
consonant with the ultimate public interest.56  The problem is even 
worse if universities outsource their technology transfer functions 
altogether to private licensing shops.57  If a university thinks of its 
role in society as a whole, if it treats patent licensing as one aspect 
of a broader technology transfer policy, it can and should develop 
 
 53 For a general argument along these lines, see generally Brett M. Frischmann, An 
Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917 
(2005). See, e.g., Stanford Office of Technology Licensing Policies, 
http://otl.stanford.edu/inventors/policies.html#research (“Inventors may place their 
inventions in the public domain if they believe that would be in the best interest of 
technology transfer.”).  And some have argued for open licensing of university 
pharmaceutical inventions in the developing world. See, e.g., Kapczynski supra note 50, 
at 1031.  By contrast, Arti Rai documents the difficulties scientists have had persuading 
universities to build an open source model for collaborative biotechnology research. See 
Arti K. Rai, “Open and Collaborative” Biomedical Research: Theory and Evidence, 29, 
35–36 (2005) (working paper), available at http://pascal.case.unibz.it/retrieve/2436/ 
rai.pdf. 
 54 For a useful step in this regard, see generally Leonard Lynn & Hal Salzman, 
Collaborative Advantage, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., Summer 2006, at 74, available at 
http://www.kauffman.org/pdf/collaborative_advantage_12_05.pdf (setting out principles 
agreed to by corporations and several major universities for making software inventions 
freely available). 
 55 For a discussion of the various ways in which university technology transfer offices 
are organized today, see Ritchie de Larena, supra note 8, at 1413. 
 56 See id. at 1416–17 (“One point that most technology-transfer managers agree upon is 
that it is not wise to judge a university’s technology-transfer office solely on licensing 
income.”). 
 57 For example, the University of Colorado has outsourced much of its patent licensing 
to Competitive Technologies Inc. 
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more enlightened policies.  A number of universities have taken 
significant steps in this regard,58 but more remains to be done. 
B. Legal Constraints on Unenlightened Universities 
If universities don’t develop such policies voluntarily, society 
may have other mechanisms to ensure that university patents don’t 
impede innovation.  Federal funding agencies can play a role.  The 
National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) has, at various times in the 
past, imposed mandates requiring universities to grant certain types 
of licenses to their work.59  The Bayh-Dole Act permits the 
government to exercise “march-in rights,” requiring that particular 
patents be licensed on non-exclusive terms,60 though those rights 
have not been used, and may prove difficult to use.61  Some have 
even suggested that publicly funded research should be subject to 
compulsory license.62  Alternatively, as universities become more 
and more vulnerable to patent infringement suits themselves,63 
private sector patent owners may be able to create some of the 
symmetry that drives cross-licenses in industries like 
semiconductors by obtaining patents that universities infringe and 
threatening to assert them against any university who sues them for 
patent infringement.64  These measures might turn out to be 
necessary, but I’d like to see us try first to solve the problem not by 
imposing a solution, but by encouraging universities to take the 
first step in recognizing their social responsibility associated with 
their patents. 
 
 58 For discussion, see Geertrui Van Overwalle, Reconciling Patent Policies with the 
University Mission, 13 ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 231, 237–38 (2006) (offering suggested 
policies). 
 59 See Wysocki, supra note 7, at A1 (noting that the NIH required Professor Axel at 
Columbia University to license his fundamental patents on methods of inserting genes 
into cells nonexclusively and at a reasonable royalty). 
 60 35 U.S.C. § 209 (2000). 
 61 See Mireles, supra note 34, at 1138 (making this argument). 
 62 See, e.g., Ron A. Bouchard, Balancing Public and Private Interests in the 
Commercialization of Publicly Funded Medical Research: Is There a Role for 
Compulsory Government Royalty Fees?, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 120, 125–26 (2007). 
 63 See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 64 There may be practical reasons why this last option is unlikely, however. See Rowe, 
supra note 16, at 940–44. 
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C. Broader Lessons: Who Is a Patent Troll? 
Finally, I think we can learn something about the raging debate 
over who’s a patent troll and what to do about trolls by looking at 
university patents.  Universities are non-practicing entities.  They 
share some characteristics with trolls, at least if the term is broadly 
defined,65 but they are not trolls.  Asking what distinguishes 
universities from trolls can actually help us figure out what 
concerns us about trolls.  One of the differences between 
universities and private licensing shops is that universities are, by 
and large, not engaged in hiding the ball, waiting until people have 
developed an industry and then popping up and demanding a 
disproportionate share of royalties based on irreversible 
investments.66  There are occasional examples of that,67 and they 
should be condemned, but it’s not the ordinary case with a 
university license.  Instead, most university licenses have a major 
technology transfer component.  A nonexclusive patent license is 
effectively nothing more than forbearance from suit in exchange 
for money.68  By contrast, most university licenses give the 
licensee not just the right to avoid a lawsuit, but also provide 
valuable know-how.  Indeed, many also involve continued work by 
the inventor, particularly if the license is to a start-up and is 
exclusive.  That sort of technology transfer is something we want 
to encourage for reasons Rob Merges has explained: granting IP 
rights allows companies not to be constrained by a particular 
definition of the firm and forced do all of our innovation in house.  
It allows us to have markets for technology.69  Markets for 
technology contribute more to society than markets for litigation 
 
 65 Cf. James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of 
the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 199 (2006) 
(“under Detkin’s definition, the U.S. government and government-funded research 
universities become trolls . . .”). 
 66 On this problem, see Lemley, Ten Things, supra note 3; Lemley & Shapiro, supra 
note 5. 
 67 For a discussion of a submarine patent strategy employed by Columbia University, 
see Ritchie de Larena, supra note 8, at 1417–18. 
 68 See, e.g., Intell. Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, 248 F.3d 1333, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (describing a nonexclusive license as nothing more than a “covenant not to sue”). 
 69 See Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1477, 1513–19 (2005). 
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rights.70  University patent owners aren’t trolls in my view when 
they contribute previously unknown technology to society, rather 
than just imposing costs on others by obtaining and asserting legal 
rights over inventions independently developed by others.71 
In the abstract, I think we could successfully define patent 
trolls by distinguishing cases in which non-manufacturing entities 
license only the right not to be sued from cases in which the patent 
owner actually engages in technology transfer.  But that’s only in 
the abstract.  Were a court ever to announce such a definition, it 
would immediately be gamed.  All true trolls would start passing 
on some mandatory know-how along with their patent licenses in 
order to avoid being categorized as trolls. 
What we ought to do instead is abandon the search for a group 
of individual companies to define as trolls.  We don’t need to focus 
on identifying bad actors.  In my view, troll is as troll does.  
Universities will sometimes be bad actors.  Nonmanufacturing 
patent owners will sometimes be bad actors.  Manufacturing patent 
owners will sometimes be bad actors.  Instead of singling out bad 
actors, we should focus on the bad acts and the laws that make 
them possible.  We will solve the troll problem not by hunting 
down and eliminating trolls, but by hunting down and eliminating 
the many legal rules that facilitate the capture by patent owners of 
a disproportionate share of an irreversible investment.  And that 
process is well underway.  We should encourage reform of current 
continuation practice, which allows patent owners to hide the true 
nature of their invention until late in the process and facilitates 
their later claiming to have invented something they did not.72  We 
 
 70 See generally ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY (2001) (noting the 
contributions of technology markets). 
 71 Indeed, Jerry and Marie Thursby argue that the continued role of the inventor in 
technology transfer is critical to the success of university licenses. Jerry G. Thursby & 
Marie C. Thursby, Are Faculty Critical? Their Role in University-Industry Licensing 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W9991, 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=450892. 
 72 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent 
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 71–84 (2004).  The PTO issued regulations that 
would limit applicants to three continuations (plus an unlimited number of divisionals) as 
a matter of right, a rule that would make a very modest step towards solving the problem. 
United States Patent & Trademark Office, Changes to Practice for Continued 
Examination Filings, Patent Applications Containing Patently Indistinct Claims, and 
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should focus on reform of the willfulness doctrine, under which a 
patent owner can get treble damages from an independent inventor 
merely by telling them about the patent and which has the perverse 
effect of causing people to try to avoid learning of patents.73  We 
should focus on reform of royalty calculation rules that give a 
disproportionate award of damages to patent owners in component 
industries because they don’t adequately take account of the 
contributions of other aspects of the invention.74  And we should 
take the opportunity presented by the Supreme Court’s eBay 
decision75 to craft intelligent standards for deciding when to grant 
injunctive relief.  If we change the rules that make patent hold-up 
such an attractive revenue generator, we won’t have to worry about 
the question of whether or not universities—or anyone else—are 
patent trolls.  We will have eliminated the problem of opportunistic 
behavior that interferes with innovation, something we want to 
stop regardless of what we call it. 
 
Examination of Claims in Patent Applications; Final Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 46716 (Aug. 21, 
2007).  At this writing it is far from clear that even these watered-down rules will go into 
effect, however; they are currently enjoined. Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D. 
Va. 2007). 
 73 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness 
Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085 (2003) (identifying this problem and proposing 
changes to deal with it).  The Patent Reform Act, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005), 
pending at this writing, would make it much more difficult to plead willfulness.  And the 
Federal Circuit took a significant step towards reducing the problem in In re Seagate 
Technology, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 74 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5; Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits 
From Reasonable Royalties (2008) (working paper). 
 75 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 946 (2006). 
